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The aim of this work is to investigate the emergence of coordination routines,
and to test the effect of different incentive structures in a laboratory organization.
Observing behavioral routines is problematic because they are automatic, stored
in tacit memory. A controlled laboratory environment allows the observation of
agent's behavior in a simulated organization consisting of two experimental sub-
jects that have to be coordinated in order to perform a shared task.
Introduction
In recent years considerable attention has focused on studying the diversity among
economic organizations, systems of agents that cooperate to achieve a "common"
goal. An important characteristic of this diversity is the fact that individuals are
able to devise many different ways to cooperate and solve problems.
The main cause of this diversity lies in path dependent features of organiza-
tionallearning: similar organizations - for example, small firms competing within
the same industry - can increase their differences over time if they respond with
different strategies to environmental changes. The different ways in which firm
responds to changes is the result of different processes of knowledge accumula-
tion, for that reason learning - as a form of knowledge acquisition - becomes the
key element to describe and understand the diversity aIllong organizations.
In an organization knowledge is organized into routines. The definition that
Nelson and Winter [3] (page 97) gave is the following: "Our general term for all
regular and predictable behavior patterns of firms is 'routine '. We use this term
to include characteristics of firms that range from well-specified technical routines
for producing things, through procedures for hiring and firing, ... in our evolution-
ary theory, these routines play the role that genes play in biological evolutionary
theory. "
March and Simon [5](page 63) gave a routine definition in a context of deci-
sion makers performing a coordinated problem solving activity: ".. a relatively
complex pattern of behavior (or the theoretical representation of such a pattern)
triggered by a relatively small number of initiating signals or choices and func-
tioning as a recognizable unit in a relatively automatic fashion ... '
One of most distinctive features in both individual and organizational learning
is path dependency!. Path dependency and organizational routines are strictly
lStudies in different theoretical areas - technological change (Kauffman 1988, Brian Arthur
1988,1989, Dosi and Kaniowsky 1994, David 1988, 1989), organizational learning (March 1981,
Levitt and March 1988, Levinthal 1994), economic and institutional change (North 1991, Den-
zau and North 1994) - claim that path dependency plays a key role in explaining the evolution
of, and differentiation among, economic organizations and institutions.
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correlated as described in the experimental work of Egidi and Narduzzo [2].
The main goal of this work is to investigate the relation between the incentive
structure, the emergence of routines, and path dependency using an experimental
approach. The experiment consists in a card game that has to be played by two
people (agents). The two agents have a common goal, so they need to cooperate.
Each agent is given a set of constrains to satisfy, and also various incentive mech-
anisms are imposed. The strategies followed by an agent to solve the problem are
studied here as functions of these different incentive mechanisms.
1 The game
Let me introduce briefly the rules of the "Target the Two" game ( for a detailed
description see Cohen and Bacdayan [1]). In each game six cards are used: 20
30 40and 2", 3... 4.... Each player has one card while the other four are on the
board. As shown in Fig.l, the four different positions on the board are named as
follows: Target, Up, DownC and DownN. In Target and Up the cards are face-up,
while face-down in the DownC and DownN. Each player can see three cards: his
own card and the cards in Target and in Up positions.
The game ends when one of the players puts 20 in the Target position. The
players alternately exchange their cards for one of the four on the board without
restriction except for the card in Target. The two player are called colorkeeper
and numberkeeper: colorkeeper is the player who can exchange his card with the
one in Target only if the two cards are of the same color (e.g. exchange 2", with
4... , or 20 with 30), while numberkeepemnly if the cards have the same number
(e.g. exchange 3\;) with 3... , or 2", with 20 ). colorkeeper always moves first, then
it is numberkeeper's turn, and so on until one of them is able to put 20 in the
Target area.
Each player can also "pass" meaning that he can skips the move so that it is once
again the partner's turn.
The game consists of 42 hands and there is a time limit of forty minutes.
At the beginning of each hand a given amount of money is assigned to the pair
of players. A fixed cost is removed from this initial endowment every times the
players move. Therefore, to maximize their reward, they have to finish as many
hands as they can in their allotted time of forty minutes, and at the same time
use the fewest moves possible. The final amount of money that the pair wins,
the payoff, can be divided in two different way: equally shared (fifty-fifty), called _
synl111etric incentive structure, or not equally, asymmetric incentive structure,
where the player that ends the game wins more money.
For this study a computerized version of the game, developed in Windows,














Figure 1: Cards positions: Nk and Ck are the players cards, C (DownC), N
(DownN). The cards are always 20 30 40 and 2... 3... 4....
board and his card that he can change using the mouse. The single player can not
see and interact with his partner. All moves, mistakes and time were recorded
for later analysis.
This game can be represented in an synthetic way making use of a subgoal
space. The graph in Fig. 2 represents this space, every node is labeled by the
Target card. Each node of the graph corresponds to a set of board configuration.
For example the node 40 represents all the possible card permutations with 40
in the Target position. The 442 strategy is the strategy where the first relevant
exchange with the Target card is made by numberkeeper and the final exchange
with the Target card by colorkeeper. In the 422 strategy the first exchange with
the Target card is made by colorkeeper and the other one by numberkeeper. It is
possible to classify the initial card configurations into two different groups: the
configurations that can be solved more easily using the 442 strategy, and the
configurations that can be solved more easily with the 422 strategy.
2 The experiment
The experimental goal is to study the effect of asymmetric incentive structure on -
the agent behavior in a controlled environment. The asymmetric payoff function
is defined as follow:






























Figure 2: Subproblems graph: each graph node is labeled by the card in Tar-
get, each connection is a card exchange with Target. The vertical links are the
transitions performed by the numberkeeper, the horizontal are performed by the
colorkeeper.
Pnk = (d - 1) p ?tot + d (1 - p) ?tot ( I )
where Ptot = (1000 - 100· nm), nm number of moves, and d is defined as follows:
d = {1 if ck put 2\7 in target
o if nk put 2\7 in target (£)
There were two different groups: unitn14 where the pairs were exposed for t!J(:
first 16 hands to asymmetric payoffs and for the others to symmetric payoff; th(:
unitn3 was exposed to symmetric payoff for the whole game. The same set. ()f
initial card configurations was given to both groups. That set consisted of t.W()
subsets: in the first 16 hands the strategy 442 was the most efficient one, whereas
the other hands were a mix of 442 and 422 hands, as one can see in Fig.6. J
compared the two groups and tested the following hypothesis: (i) asymmet.rj(;
incentives allow subjects to explore a larger subspace of the strategy space, (ii)
if the previous statement is verified then I expect an higher efficiency level i rJ
the group exposed to asymmetric incentives. Other configurations sets have bC(:TJ
studied and reported in [4]. The complete experimental design shown in t!J(;
following Table2 .
2'1' in the 2nd column of the table means "Incentive structure." 'yes' means asymmcl.rj{;
incentives (payoffs) and 'no' means symmetric ones in the learning period.
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session I group treatment
learning test
unitn3 no grp422 422 oriented mixed 422/442
f-- [1..15] ~ f-- [16..42] ~
no grp442 442 oriented mixed 422/442
f-- [1..15] ~ f-- [16..42] ~
unitn14 ~e~ grp422 422 oriented mixed 422/442
f-- [1..15] ~ f-- [16..42] ~
~e~ grp442 442 oriented mixed 422/442
f-- [1..15] ~ f-- [16..42] ~
The experiments were done at the CEEL, Computable and Experimental Eco-
nomics Laboratory in Trento University Italy3. The maximum amount of money
that a single player could win was about $25. The experimental subjects were
chosen among undergraduate students in Economics, Law, and Sociology. The
total number of students were 320.
3 Results and discussion
At the beginning I compared the number of moves in the two treatments, see
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Figure 3: Aggregate number of moves per hand in the two groups.
3http://www-ceel.economia.unitn.it
~ 869-
Number of moves per hand
Group







As one can see in Fig.3, during the learning period the group with asymmetric
payoff used on average 40% more moves than the other one. How might this be
explained? The first 15 hands can be easily solved using the 442 strategy meaning
that colorkeeper is the favorite in moving the 2<:; in Target, closing the game and
receiving 80% of the total payoff.
A numberkeeper reaction resulting in anti-cooperative behavior was observed.
The numberkeeper can punish colorkeeper with an inefficient solution acting in two
different way: forcing the number of moves to be greater than 20 or generating




unitn3 [1 15] 3
unitn14 [1 15] 37
unitn3 [16 42] 0






The numberkeeper non-cooperative behavior was effective: it pushed colorkeeper
to behave in a "fair" way. As a matter of fact 37% of hands in the learning period
were closed by numberkeeper even if this kind of solution was inefficient.
The experimental pairs behavior can be classified on the basis of the chosen
path in the subproblem space. The Fig.4 shows the computed optimal strategy
for each hand. In the 25th hand the 442 and 422 strategy were equivalent. Next I
compared the strategy used by the two groups in the first and second part of the
experiment. As we know the first 15 hands were solved optimally using the 442
strategy. In figure 5 the comparison between the two treatments are shown: the
group with symmetric incentives behaves in a quasi-optimal way, and vice-versa
the group with asymmetric payoff plays an inefficient mixture of 442 and 422
strategies.
Use 442 strategy
Group x 82 t-test
unitn3 [1..15] 92,21 8,50 1 05.10-7
unitn14 [1..15] 63,35 6,25 ,
During the control period both groups were exposed to symmetric incentives
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Figure 4: Optimal probability to play 442 strategy.
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Figure 5: Use (percentage) of the 442 strategy during the first 15 hands
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payoffs during the first part of the experiment tended to be routinized on the
442 strategy. The group exposed to the asymmetric payoffs tended to play both
strategies instead of pursuing the most efficient one. The plot in figure 6 shows
the group percentage that chose to play the 442 strategy. The offset between

















The histograms in figure 3 shows the distribution of the 442 versus 422 during
the experiment control part. The difference between the two treatments is clear.
4 Conclusion
The learning path dependency in a simple artificial organization has been studied.
In particular the effects of different incentive structures on the learning process
has been analyzed using an unusual experimental economics approach. I have
shown that the behavioral diversity is driven by the learning dynamics, and this
in turn is very sensitive to the incentive structure. The results presented can be
summarized as following. The asymmetric payoff structure has a strong impact
on the players strategies and on the players efficiency. The group exposed to
asymmetric incentives explored the strategy space in a broader way, but the
players were unable to exploit this knowledge in an efficient way. The pairs of
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players demonstrated a lack of coordination. The path dependent learning effect
was also found to be very strong in all the settings. In this experiment the
organization consisted of two agents. A natural extension would be to have more
than two agents, and to increase the complexity of their task. This is now the
subject of current research.
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